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1. Introduction
Money is generally defined as any object generally accepted and used as a medium of
exchange. Throughout much of history, the term “money” has referred to a stock of com-
modity money, typically gold and silver. In modern contexts, the term “money” is most com-
monly used to refer to a stock of banknotes issued by a central bank and a stock of
government-issued coins. The bulk of currency in use today in Japan, for example, consists of
banknotes, representing debt obligations of the Bank of Japan. Bank notes and coins – the
pocket money held by the public – are important components of the money supply.
However, one of the largest components of the money supply today is demand deposits (or
checking accounts), which are the debt of a private bank and can easily be used to make
payments.
Historically, bank liabilities took the form of bank notes redeemable in specie (gold and
silver coin) and were often a prominent source of an economy’s money supply. In time, the
privilege of issuing notes was concentrated to a bank that became the central bank. The
central bank took over the issue of bank notes, maintaining the promise to redeem them in
specie on demand. The rest of the banks, which were prevented from issuing notes,
transformed into banks of deposit (commercial banks). Commercial banks then started to
issue demand deposits instead of bank notes1). Thus banks were divided into two categories:
the central bank and commercial banks.
In the beginning, central bank notes circulated as the medium of exchange for most
transactions among firms instead of specie, whereas transactions between consumers and firms
were exclusively conducted in specie2). Kawai (1970) refers to the former as “the commercial
1) Nowadays the issue of bank notes is in most countries a monopoly of the central bank.
2) Adam Smith (1937, p. 306) notes that “the circulation of every country may be considered as
divided into two different branches; the circulation of the dealers with one another, and the
circulation between the dealers and the consumers.”
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circulation” and the latter as “the general circulation”3). The medium of exchange was
divided according to the transaction. The wholesale transaction in the commercial circulation
was conducted in bank notes and the retail transaction in the general circulation was conducted
in specie.
In the course of time, the high resource cost of specie led to substitution of convertible
notes for specie as the medium of exchange for retail transactions4). Central bank notes began
to be used to conduct transactions between merchants and consumers, taking the place of
specie. Then the central bank removed its promise to convert notes into specie on demand.
Notes issued by the central bank have become inconvertible and intrinsically useless. Such
money is referred to as definitive money5). Central bank notes have been decreed by
governments as legal tender, meaning that legally people must accept them in exchange. A
strong motive for legal tender legislation was the government’s desire to earn revenue from
seigniorage6). Central bank notes and government-issued coins are mainly used to conduct
retail transactions, typically of low values7).
Private banks’ liabilities fill the vacancy on the medium of exchange for wholesale
transactions. Nowadays the medium of exchange for wholesale transactions is not bank notes,
but checks written on deposit accounts held in commercial banks8). The liabilities of private
banks, regarded as part of the money supply, consist of deposits that are redeemable for central
bank notes on demand. Commercial banks’ liabilities are today a prominent source of money
supply in any leading industrial economy.
This paper addresses a number of related questions concerning the activity of money
creation and the business of banking. The first question concerns money. Why do private
bank liabilities circulate from account to account and constitute an economy’s money supply?
3) Kawai employs the division of circulation to develop original discussions of the financial system.
See Kawai (1981) and (1982).
4) For discussions of this point and specie shortage, see Kawai (1982).
5) Money that is not convertible into gold or precious metal is called definitive money. Money of
this type is also called fiat money.
6) See Russell (1991, pp. 38–39). Kaufman (1995, p. 20) adduces another reason that specie was
subject to variations in supply as the monetary and intrinsic values of specie changed relative to
each other.
7) For example, Bank of Japan notes are unlimited legal tender within Japan, though each coin is
limited legal tender of up to 20 of the same coin. Coins today are pure tokens whose value does
not depend on their intrinsic content.
8) Strictly speaking, deposit accounts against which checks are drawn are regarded as money, rather
than the checks themselves.
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In other words, why do people accept private banks’ liabilities as a means of payment
rather than central bank notes or government-issued coins ? The second issue concerns the
business of banking. Commercial banks bear the responsibility of issuing new money into
circulation, which they do by making loans. The basic business of banking is a combination
of two functions: payments and lending. Banks carry out the creation of deposits through
lending. In other words, banks combine the payment service and lending, thereby creating
money.
Commercial banks also act as financial intermediaries, accepting deposits of existing
money that people and businesses wish to save. However, there is a big difference between
monetary and non-monetary financial intermediaries. Commercial banks differ from many
other financial institutions in one critical respect. Banks have the power to create money in
the form of new demand deposits through their payment services. Their dual functions of
creating money and providing loans has made them “special” intermediaries9). Then the
second issue addressed here relates to the payment system, which enable its constituent
institutions to carry out the creation of deposits through lending. This paper investigates how
commercial banks issue new money into circulation, and investigates the mechanism by which
new money is transferred between economic players when they make payments.
To appreciate the payment system, including the evolution and structure of its constituent
institutions, it is necessary to understand not only its monetary aspects, but also its financial
aspects10). This paper provides a unified analysis of the underlying economic forces driving
the evolution of the payment system and organization of its members11). The evolution of the
payment system has been driven by economic benefits from substituting credit for money.
This paper emphasizes that economic benefits of the substitution of credit for money are
divided into two categories. First, the economic benefits from substituting bank notes for
commodity money; second, the economic benefits from substituting credit for cash trading.
Monetary economists have confused these with each other or have generally ignored the latter12).
9) Though a bit obsolete, for a typical statement that banks are special, see Corrigan (1982).
10) Goodfriend (1990).
11) Of course, I am not the first to pay attention to the underlying driving forces of the development
of the payment system. Kawai (1954) contains an excellent analytical description of the
evolution of the payment system. More recently, Goodfriend (1990) employs contract theory to
provide an analytical discussion of that evolution. They are independent of each other. I view
my work as complementary to these works, though I owe much to Kawai.
12) Judging from his treatment of bank notes as commodity money, Goodfriend (1900) seems to be
vague in differentiating between the two economic benefits.
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The efficiency gains from substituting credit for cash trading have been the fundamental
driving forces in the development of the payment system.
This paper presents a simple environment that gives rise to banks that create new money
through making loans. Money is here defined as any object that circulates widely as a
medium of exchange. In the model, this object takes the form of a redeemable deposit. In this
paper a simple story of transferable debt is developed. The paper is organized as follows. The
next section describes the model in detail and presents its key features. Section 3 char-
acterizes the business of banking. Section 4 contains a discussion of the structure of banking.
The final section summarizes the findings and suggests directions for future research.
2. A Basic Model
The basic model is illustrated in Chart 1. To begin with, assume that there are four
agents: a supplier, A; a manufacturer, B; a merchant, C; and a consumer, D13). Time is
discrete and divided into three periods (t = 0, 1, 2). Supplier A owns raw materials and can
provide manufacturer B with them in period 0. B uses the raw materials to make certain
goods. He also owns merchandise made from raw materials in period 0. If merchant C has
access to the merchandise, then she can transfer them into salable merchandise (consumer
goods). In period 1, merchant C purchases merchandise from B in order to sell them to
consumer D. Consumer D receives his salary in period 1. He uses it to purchase consumer
13) The model developed here is adapted from that of Kahn and Roberds (2002).
Chart 1 Trade in a Simple Model Economy
Flow of Goods
Flow of Cash
Flow of Credit
Sequence of Events
漓 B sells merchandise to C and receives C’s debt in return.
滷 A sells materials to B and receives B’s debt or C’s debt in return.
澆 C sells goods to D and D pays cash to C.
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goods from merchant C in period 2. Merchant C collects money from consumer D in period
2. It takes a certain length of time for C to sell her goods for cash, and so C always holds a
certain amount of average inventories14).
How should exchange be organized in the basic model? Trade could proceed if C had
enough money to purchase merchandise from B in period 1. However, C doesn’t have enough
money available for use, or is eager to economize on working capital. Hence, there may be a
better arrangement available. The alternative would be trade credit. In a monetary economy,
all businesses make substantial outlays before they obtain any revenue. Revenue coming in
pays for past production, but there are always new expenses for ongoing day-to-day activities
of the firm. This is true even after a business has started. In short, the basic problem is that
businesses incur expenses before they can sell their products.
The funds required to cover the current expenses of producing and selling a product or
service are known as working capital. The need for additional working capital is one reason
why businesses borrow, or why businesses use trade credit. On the other hand, production
requires long-term investment in equipment and facilities. The funds required are known as
fixed capital. The need for fixed capital is the second reason businesses borrow. Monetary
economists have exclusively paid attention to the second reason, ignoring the first one15).
Trade credit is a form of short-term financing that arises from business transactions
between firms. In contrast to cash terms, trade credit terms separate the payment date from
the date of delivery. Returning to the model, merchant C could expect to get sales proceeds
from consumer D in period 2, so C could issue debt (IOU) to manufacturer B in return for
merchandise. With a trade credit, C obtains merchandise without paying any money.
Although no money is lent, C succeeds in economizing on working capital. At the same time,
B receives C’s debt in lieu of cash. However, B must also get materials in order to continue
his business operation. In the hope of economizing on additional working capital, B in turn
asks A to sell raw materials to him on deferred payment in period 2. In this context, there are
two ways for B to use bills of exchange as an instrument of trade credit16).
14) Bulk order for goods leads to large inventories but may be worthwhile if merchant C can obtain
lower prices from manufacturer B. C is often willing to hold a large inventory of goods because
bulk orders yield quantity discounts.
15) While trade credit has been generally dealt with, in connection with working capital management,
by financial economists, it has received relatively little attention from monetary economists.
16) Much of the discussion below is based on Kawai (1954), Moriyama (1994), and Kahn and
Roberds (2002).
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The first way is that B issues his own debt. B could issue his own debt to A in return for
the materials. Both A’s and B’s debt claims are payable at a later date, meaning when C
receives the proceeds of her goods sales from D in period 2. When the time comes, B
presents C with the debt C issued in period 1 and A presents B with the debt B issued in period
1. If B and C are trustworthy debtors, C can, using the proceeds of her sale to D, repay B and
B can use C’s repayment to repay A.
In an environment where creditor’s rights are limited, however, there is a good chance that
B may be unreliable. Because B does not have merchandise any longer when the time comes
for him to repay, A’s ability to force payment by using the merchandise as collateral is
limited. In such cases the credit chain may break: B may take the money and run17).
The second way is that B transfers C’s debt to A. B could use C’s debt to settle with A
in lieu of his own debt. This means that A gives credit to B, and that B’s debt to A can be
discharged by the transfer of C’s debt to A. In contrast to the first situation, however, B does
not hold C’s debt but instead hands over C’s debt to A. Then, when C’s cash becomes
available in period 2, C pays A directly, avoiding a possible default by B. As long as the
original debtor C honored her debt, the intermediate party B were in effect removed from the
credit chain. This removal reduces the need for payment in cash and limits the chance for
default by B18).
As mentioned above, it is quite obvious that buyers have a strong incentive to use trade
credit, because they can economize on additional working capital by using trade credit. At the
same time, sellers are willing to supply trade credit on economic grounds. In the context of
the model, for example, B purchases materials from A while he supplies his products to C.
He is a supplier on the one hand, and a customer on the other. Supplier and customer are
changing positions with each other in their ongoing business operations19). Then B offers
trade credit to C, anticipating that he will be able to receive trade credit from A. B provides
trade credit as a supplier and uses it as a customer20).
At any rate, trade credit could increase economic efficiency because it could induce
offsetting out of obligations. However, the economic benefit gained from trade credit is
17) Kahn and Roberds (2002, p. 3).
18) Kahn and Roberds (2002) argue that the introduction of transferable debt provides efficiency
gains by lessening room for default as well as economizing on using costly coin.
19) For the two-way nature of transaction in trade credit, see Peel, Wilson and Howorth (2000, p. 17).
20) Merchants are an exception. They sell goods for cash, while they purchase goods on deferred
payment.
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twofold. The first benefit, well known to economists, is that the substitution of credit for cash
trading can economize on the amount of cash needed to carry out an exchange. The second
benefit of trade credit, which this article focuses on, is that businesses can economize on
working capital by substituting credit for cash trading. The second benefit has received
relatively little attention from monetary economists21). This paper partially rectifies this
omission by providing a basic idea of trade credit and its important role in the evolution of the
payment system.
This paper emphasizes the difference between the efficiency gains from substituting credit
for cash trading and the efficiency gains from substituting bank notes for commodity
money. At the social level both of these gains provide an economic benefit by reducing
transaction costs or the resource cost of coin. At the individual level, however, the reduced
funds for working capital provide efficiency gains by minimizing funds needed for ongoing
business operations. While, the substituting of bank notes for commodity money does not
provide any efficiency at the individual level. In other words, it does not bring about any
capital savings. It is the economic gains at the individual level that have played a crucial role
in evolving the payment system. The development of the payment system has been primarily
promoted by capital savings. The social benefits such as reduction of transaction costs or the
resource cost of coin are concomitant benefits. They, as such, could not be the motivation for
the evolution of the payment system.
Business firms usually make use of trade credit for economizing on working capital.
Trade credit is the backbone of commercial finance. As an instrument of credit, bills of
exchange have played a vital role in financing working capital. Bills of exchange with an
endorsement started to circulate from hand to hand among business firms. However, the
hand-to-hand circulation of these bills was very limited. Businesses met with difficulty in
arranging trade credit with each other. The widespread use of trade credit suffered from at
least three obstacles.
The first is the problem of debtors’ (such as B or C) creditworthiness. If C had a bad
reputation, B would not agree to sell his products in exchange for C’s debt. Likewise, A
would not accept C’s debt, even it had B’s endorsement. The second is a technical defect.
Each bill had a specific face value based on the original transaction. For example, the trade
volume between B and C was not necessarily the same as that between B and A. Therefore, B
21) Due to the same reason as footnote 15 above, there is little literature paying attention to capital
saving, while there is an enormous amount of literature about cash or transaction costs saving.
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faced difficulty in using C’s debt in settlement of his own debt to A22). B could not always
use C’ debt as an instrument of trade credit.
The last obstacle is a fundamental drawback. The bills of exchange are not suitable for
paying wages. They have a particular face value and specified maturity date in the future and
are indivisible. Consumers face difficulty in using them for daily purchase. Therefore con-
sumers refuse to receive them as payment of wages23). The creditworthiness problem also ex-
ists in credit trading between merchants and consumers. The merchants need information
about the consumers’ potential returns and risk associated with the credit trading. It is not
easily or cheaply available, because transactions between them in the general circulation are
spot transactions. The merchants are unwilling to receive the consumers’ debt, too. Bills of
exchange can not circulate in the general circulation. Due to these drawbacks, the use of bills
of exchange was basically limited to wholesale transactions and did not become widespread24).
The transaction problems with bills of exchange created opportunities for private firms to
make a profit by issuing notes in more convenient forms. The drawbacks of bills of exchange
gave rise to banks becoming an issuer of “negotiable debt,” such as bank notes. To overcome
the defects of bills of exchange, a wealthy dealer (suppose Z), whose reputation was well
known within the business community, started to provide guarantees to others. He provided
credit enhancement by endorsing the bills of others – a practice known as acceptance. His
acceptance alleviated creditworthiness constraints of debtors and enhanced the safety and the
transferability of the bill of exchange.
In the model, for example, in order to eliminate the creditworthiness problem, Z accepts
C’s debt, endorsing it. C’s debt with credit enhancement became safer and more negotiable.
So, in exchange for his goods, B may receive C’s debt with Z’s guarantee without so much
worry. The accepted bill, however, still had a few drawbacks. Firstly, each accepted bill
had a particular face value arising from the original trade. Secondly, the accepted bills had a
specific maturity date. Accordingly, the use of the accepted bills was still limited.
Next, to remove these drawbacks, Z began to issue his own debt, rather than accepting the
other notes. Increasingly, Z issued his debt in exchange for C’s debt. As Z was wealthier
22) For example, Ashton (1953, pp. 37–38) describes these inconveniences for merchants in the early
history of bills of exchange in England.
23) In Japan, for instance, Article 24 of the Labor Standards Law stipulates that wages must be paid
in cash and in full directly to the workers.
24) There were legal obstacles besides these technical drawbacks. For legal obstacles to the hand-
to-hand circulation of bills obligatory, see Calomiris (2003).
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and a stronger credit risk than C, Z’s debt became more acceptable. Creditors would be
delighted to accept Z’s debt rather than the merchant’ debt with Z’s guarantee. However,
there were still same defects to overcome. Z’s debt had a specific maturity date and specified
face value. B, for example, could use Z’s debt in exchange for purchase of materials, but
could not use it for the payment of wages. B needs to have the wherewithal to make
payments of wages on payday. B could not economize on additional working capital for
wages.
As described earlier, consumer goods at a shop have to wait for a certain length of time
before they are sold for money. Similarly, the proceeds of consumer goods sales stay in the
hand of the merchant for a period before being disbursed to repayments or to pay wages. In
the model, for example, C holds cash collected from the sale of consumer goods to D until her
debt becomes due in period 2. C therefore lodges the daily proceeds with Z, because she is in
debt to Z. She must have the wherewithal to repay Z when her debt becomes due in period
2. Z begins to keep the proceeds in his vault for C’s sake. These proceeds are the
fundamental resources of reserve deposits of commercial banks25).
Commercial banks today accept deposits not only from business firms, but also from
private individuals. However, banks’ fundamental funds mainly consist of the proceeds of the
merchants selling goods to consumers. To keep things simple, in the simple model, banks are
assumed to accept only the proceeds of merchants, and not to accept savings from
households26).
In the course of time, it becomes obvious to Z that money is coming in and gradually
accumulating until C’s debt becomes due. When C’s debt falls due, C repays Z with her
deposit at Z. As C’s debt to Z could be canceled with C’s deposit, Z could freely make use of
funds that have been deposited by C at Z. It means that C repays her debt to Z little by little
out of daily sales proceeds.
When C’s debt becomes due, A and B bring Z’s notes to Z in order to redeem them for
specie. Z pays them in specie that C has lodged with him. A and B could receive their
25) It is worth noting that fundamental resources of funds of commercial banks are the proceeds of
retailers, which are essentially different from household savings. This is a reason why
commercial banks have tended to restrict themselves to short-term loans.
26) Historically, at the first stage, banks have accepted deposits of sales proceeds (such as demand
deposits), and at the second stage, banks then have accepted savings deposits from households
(such as fixed-term deposits). Nowadays, at the third stage, banks also accept demand deposits
from households, reflecting the wide use of electronic funds transfer between bank accounts as a
means of payment.
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proceeds in a lump sum. However A and B leave some portion of their proceeds with Z,
because they don’t need to pay the proceeds all at a time. Rather they have to keep specie for
the coming wage day. Z has a safeguarded vault. Then, A and B keep their surplus funds
deposited at Z even after C’s debt becomes due. This is another resource of reserve deposits
of commercial banks.
When the payday comes, A and B withdraw specie from their account to pay wages to
their employees or workers. At the same time, C begins again to accumulate her daily
proceeds at Z in order to replenish her deposit and pay back her new debt. Z observes a
considerable sum of specie always staying in his vault. Issuing notes redeemable for specie
on demand out of these funds is a natural evolution of his business.
Then Z decides to issue notes redeemable in specie on demand rather than notes with a
specific maturity date same as the original note, making use of specie in his vault for
redemption of the notes. Z begins to issue his own notes with round numbered face values,
redeemable in specie on demand. This note is known as a bank note. Finally Z has become
a banker with his own note issuing. To eliminate the drawbacks of bills of exchange, a crucial
step in the evolution of the payment system occurred with the development of modern banking:
the birth of the issuing bank.
3. The Business of Banking
A bank issues its own bank note redeemable in specie on demand rather than accepting the
other notes. In the model, for example, C brings her own promissory note to bank Z. If Z
approves the loan to C, Z issues bank notes for C, and receives C’s debt in exchange. This is
a classical banking operation, known as discounting commercial bills. In other words, the
bank buys promissory notes or bills of exchange, due at a specified date in the future, for a
bank note redeemable on demand at a discount to the face value. The difference between the
purchase price of the bill and the face value means interest at a certain rate for the intervening
time.
Bank notes are redeemable for specie on demand and their face values are in round
numbers. They are much more convenient for exchange purposes than bills of exchange.
They circulate as the medium of exchange for most transactions between firms in lieu of bills
of exchange, thereby taking the place of specie. In the model, for example, merchant C
receives bank notes in exchange for her own promissory note. C purchases merchandise from
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B with the bank notes. B will be delighted to accept the bank notes because they are
redeemable for specie on demand and dividable. As bank notes are redeemable for specie on
demand, B can get specie for making payments of wages on payday. B also can use some
portion of them in exchange for the purchase of raw materials from A. Accordingly, B can
save additional working capital, not only for materials but also for wages. B succeeds in
financing additional working capital completely.
Bank notes circulate as the medium of exchange for wholesale transactions in the
commercial circulation in place of specie. However, payment in bank notes initially
developed as an alternative to private promises of payment (bills of exchange). Promise of
payment by banks is more credible than promise of payment by firms and bank notes are
redeemable on demand. Therefore, bank notes are much more convenient for exchange
purposes among firms than bills of exchange. Payment in bank notes surely involves lower
transaction costs than payment in specie. However these economic benefits are social and
secondary benefits.
Now A and B hold bank notes. They could redeem them for specie as soon as they
receive them. However, they must worry about theft. It is costly and cumbersome. There
is a less costly alternative. Bank Z has a well-guarded vault so A and B decide to keep bank
notes. They don’t redeem bank notes until they need specie to spend. It essentially means
that they have deposits redeemable on demand at bank Z. When the payday comes, they bring
bank notes to Z, and redeem them for specie in order to pay wages to their employees or
workers. This means, in effect, that they withdraw specie from their accounts at bank Z for
the payment of wages. It was natural for business firms to understand that they hold deposits
redeemable on demand at the bank.
On the other hand, as bank notes are redeemable for specie on demand, Z always needs to
have the wherewithal to deliver the required amount of specie, called cash reserve or vault
cash. However, C everyday deposits her daily proceeds in her account with Z for future
repayment. As mentioned above, Z can make use of specie lying in his vault. In case of
redemption, Z utilizes this specie in order to deliver the required amount of specie. Cash
reserves of banks consist of cash collected from the sale of consumer goods27).
In the simple model, C’s sales proceeds are assumed to be equal to the sum of added value
of A, B, and C. For example, the money which A, B, and C spend in payment of wages
27) In our model, cash reserves of commercial banks comprise sales proceeds of merchants or cash
from the general circulation.
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arrives at merchant C because wage earners spend all of their incomes to purchase consumer
goods from C28). Merchant C collects money spent by consumers. Then C brings cash
receipts to Z and lodges them with Z. When payday comes, A, B, and C again withdraw
specie from their accounts to pay wages to their employees. Thus, specie circulates through
banks between business firms and consumers. Bank notes exclusively circulate among
business firms in the commercial circulation, whereas specie mainly passes from hand to hand
in the general circulation.
Trades among firms are usually large. In the model, for example, C needs to carry large
amounts of bank notes in order to pay B. Large sums might require secure transportation.
The physical transfer of large amounts of notes is a bit cumbersome. On the other hand, bank
Z needs to hold cash reserves against notes in order to accommodate redemption of notes and
to avoid insolvency. Bank Z, however, has a strong incentive to minimize holdings of cash
reserves because such reserves yield no interest. Bankers’ desire to minimize cash reserves
needed for redemption of notes was another driving force for the development of the payment
system. Attempts by banks to reduce the need to hold large balances in reserves led to the
next step in the evolution of the payment system, that is the development of modern banking:
the emergence of deposit banking.
Accordingly, the bank allows customers to make payments by transferring ownership of
deposits rather than by transferring the bank notes. The customer could use the funds in the
account by ordering the bank to pay a particular amount to a third party named on the
order. Such an order is called a check. Checks have a major advantage that they can be
written for any amount up to the balance in the account. A check could have any specific face
value. Therefore, checks are more suitable for conducting wholesale transactions than bank
notes whose face values are in round numbers.
The accounts on which checks can be written are called demand deposits or checking
accounts. Demand deposits are also bank liabilities on demand. There is little difference
between bank notes and deposit liabilities. Banks voluntarily gave up issuing notes and began
issuing deposit liabilities instead29). Demand deposits soon replaced notes as the bank’s major
form of liability. All but one issuing bank was transformed into banks of deposit (deposit
banking). As described earlier, banking institutions have been divided into two categories, the
28) To keep things simple, assume that households spend all of their income.
29) In many countries, although banks were legally prevented from issuing notes, they were not
particularly affected by the ban. Banks must have quit issuing notes regardless of the ban.
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central bank of issue and private commercial banks, thereby constituting a two-tiered banking
structure.
The medium of exchange has been also divided over transactions. Commercial banks’
liabilities are used for conducting wholesale transactions in the commercial circulation. On
the other hand, central bank notes are used for conducting retail transactions in the general
circulation, taking the place of specie. Then central bank notes have evolved into definitive
money decreed by a government as legal tender but not convertible into specie, that is, cash
with finality. As previously noted, nowadays the provision of definitive money is a normal
function of most central banks.
Checks are a kind of IOU payable in cash on demand that allows transactions to take place
without the need to carry around large amounts of cash. Payment in bank deposits often
involves lower transactions costs than payment in cash. However, payment in bank deposits
initially developed as an alternative to payment in bank notes, not to payment in cash.
The bankers’ incentive to minimize cash reserves has been a driving force that caused the
invention of checks. One of the major advantages of a check is that banks can reduce cash
reserves against deposits with it. Reserve savings have been the motivation for the
introduction of checks that improve the efficiency of the payment system, thereby reducing
transaction costs associated with payments.
Returning to the model, if Z approves the loan to C, Z accepts C’s note and creates for C
his deposit in exchange30). C’s deposit derives from the proceeds of his note. He has deposit
without ever having deposited any cash with the bank. This is the so called the credit creating
activity by banks.
The next section investigates how commercial banks issue new money and how they
facilitate its use in transactions in the economy.
4. The Banking Structure
Payment with hand-to-hand currency (cash) is straightforward: you just hand it
over. Payment with bank deposits is more complicated. You need some way to transfer
ownership of the deposit to the recipient. Because, unlike bank notes, checks do not circulate
hand to hand, collecting funds from the bank on which the check was written – the paying bank
30) This is also called discounting commercial bills.
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– increased in importance. Clearing payments within the same bank is quicker and cheaper
than clearing payments between banks. Therefore, it is very important for the paying bank to
accept the checks which were written on it.
Let us take the case of clearing within a bank. C pays his supplier, B, with a check that
he draws on his bank. If B has an account at the same bank, he is credited. The check has
effected the payment without physically delivering cash (see Chart 2). The bank can reduce
reserves against deposits. Accepting checks which are drawn on the bank itself is as
important as accepting the checks which are drawn on the other banks. Then the paying bank
also endeavors to receive the checks drawn on it. The best way to receive the checks drawn
on it is to have branch offices at places where offices of recipients of the checks are located.
Banks organize a network to follow credit flow, that is, to collect checks drawn on themselves.
The advantage of a branch banking system is obvious. The bank’s branch network gives a
substantial advantage in executing payments between business firms.
However, even under a branch banking system, the greater part of the checks are not
deposited at the same bank on which they are written. Banks mutually receive checks drawn
on the other bank. By itself, receiving a check drawn on the other bank does not do a bank
much good. It needs to collect the funds from the bank on which the check is drawn. For
payment, checks have to be presented physically at the paying bank. Until the funds were
collected, the receiving bank could not utilize the proceeds.
The process by which the check is sent from the receiving bank to the paying bank and
payment is transmitted the other way is termed check clearing31). In the early days, the
31) Along with checks, bills (promissory notes and bills of exchange) that have reached their payment
date are sent from the receiving bank to the paying bank.
Chart 2 Transfer of Funds within Bank
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receiving bank sent a messenger with checks to the bank on which they were drawn in order to
collect funds. The messenger received the proceeds in cash and returned to the bank. At the
same time, the other banks sent their messengers to the bank for collection, too. It was time
consuming and cost a lot.
To improve the efficiency of interbank check clearing in a given market area, banks joined
together to establish a clearinghouse32). The operation of a clearinghouse may be seen best by
employing a hypothetical model of the banking system33). Let us take the case of a four-bank
system (see Chart 3). Assume that at the end of a business day, bank W has received
¥400,000 in checks drawn on bank X, ¥200,000 in checks drawn on bank Y, ¥200,000 in
checks drawn on bank Z. Bank X has received checks of ¥300,000 drawn on bank W,
¥500,000 on bank Y, and ¥100,000 on bank Z. Bank Y has ¥300,000 in checks on bank W,
¥200,000 on bank X, and ¥600,000 on bank Z. Bank Z, in turn, has ¥100,000 in checks on
bank W, ¥100,000 in checks on bank X , and ¥200,000 in checks on bank Y.
32) Japan’s first clearinghouse was founded in Osaka in 1879. The Tokyo Clearinghouse followed in
1887. At present, there are 418 clearinghouses in Japan (as of the end of March 2005) and 272 of
them are administered by individual bankers associations.
33) The description of the operation of a clearinghouse below is based on Van den Bergh (1994) and
Kaufman (1995).
34) Based on Van den Bergh (1994, p. 36).
Chart 3 Check Clearing on a Gross Basis34)
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If there is no clearinghouse, banks settle each and every payment individually on a gross
basis. Each bank could send messengers the next morning to deliver the checks to the
appropriate bank for immediate payment in cash. Thus, bank W would send messengers to
banks X, Y and Z to collect ¥400,000, ¥200,000 and ¥200,000, respectively, from each.
There is a good chance that they might run into the messengers sent by the other banks to
collect payment on the checks drawn on bank W. Or they are likely to pass each other
carrying cash to each other’s banks. The messenger from bank W carries cash from bank X
while the messenger from bank X carries cash from bank W. In total, the messengers carry
¥3,200,000 from bank to bank.
It quickly becomes obvious to banks that the clearing process could be greatly expedited if
everyone brought their checks to a central location. The banks collect checks by a bilateral
exchange and settlement with each other. For example, bank W owes ¥300,000 to bank X.
And bank X owes ¥400,000 to bank W. Then bank X would pay the difference of ¥100,000
in cash to bank W. Bank W owes ¥300,000 to bank Y. Bank Y owes ¥200,000 to bank W.
Then bank W would pay the difference of ¥100,000 in cash to bank Y and so on. In total, the
amount of ¥1,000,000 now changes hands. The bilateral net settlement reduces the necessary
amount to ¥1,000,000 (see Chart 4). The banking system’s need for settlement of balances is
35) Based on Van den Bergh (1994, p. 37).
Chart 4 Check Clearing on a Bilateral Net Basis35)
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reduced by two-thirds.
When the participants in a clearinghouse exceed a certain number, however, the check
clearing becomes long and complicated. The formula for the number of clearing operations in
the check clearing on a bilateral basis is:36)
N = n (n - 1) ÷2
Where: N = total number of clearing operations
n = number of member banks
In a clearinghouse of 20 member banks, there would be 190 clearing operations. This
large number of operations would make check clearing both costly and inefficient. To reduce
the number of clearing operations and simplify clearing, all banks could send messengers to a
clearinghouse and the exchange could be made with one party, namely, the clearinghouse.
This would reduce the number of clearing operations to n, that is the number of member banks
(see Chart 5).
A further reduction in the value of actual settlements is achieved through multilateral
clearing, as shown in Table 1. The clearinghouse would sum all the checks by bank. It
would find that banks W, X, Y and Z had ¥700,000, ¥700,000, ¥900,000 and ¥900,000 in
36) This formula also applies to the number of different prices in a barter economy. (where: N = total
number of prices, n = number of different goods)
Chart 5 Check Clearing through a Clearinghouse
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checks drawn on them respectively and deposited at the other three banks. The sums owed by
them are shown in the vertical columns. This payment would be deducted from the amount
each bank would collect from the others. The sums owed to the banks are shown in the
horizontal rows.
For example, bank W collects ¥800,000, but owes ¥700,000; bank X collects ¥900,000,
but owes ¥700,000; bank Y collects ¥1,100,000, but owes ¥900,000; bank Z collects ¥400,000,
but owes ¥900,000. The clearing process makes it possible to compare very quickly how
much each member bank owes to every other member bank and how much each of the other
member banks owes it. The difference for each bank between what is owed to it and what it
owes is called the clearing balance. The minus differences are referred to as negative clearing
balances, which must be paid.
However, unlike the bilateral clearing, the bank with a negative balance can not specify
the bank to which the balance is to be paid. Because it’s negative balance means net debt
 Table 1    Clearing Chart Showing Transaction between Four Banks37)
37) Reproduced from Van den Bergh (1994, p. 39) and Kaufman (1995, p. 261).
Bank receiving payment
Bank sending payment
W
X
Y
Z
Total received
Total owed
Net
Total
owed
700,000
700,000
900,000
900,000
300,000 300,000 100,000
100,000200,000400,000
200,000
200,000
500,000
100,000 600,000
200,000
800,000 900,000 1,100,000 400,000
700,000 700,000 900,000 900,000
100,000 200,000 200,000 △500,000
W X Y Z
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towards every other member bank as a whole. Therefore, bank Z, in our case, pays ¥500,000
to the clearinghouse. The clearinghouse, in turn, pays banks, W, X and Y, ¥100,000,
¥200,000 and ¥200,000 respectively. Thus the clearing of payments among banks is
organized through the clearinghouse.
Bank Z could pay this amount by physically delivering cash. However, there are less
costly alternatives. Banks W, X and Y could simply agree to hold a ¥500,000 deposit at bank
Z: it may well have to use it the next day to settle with bank Z. Or the member banks could
keep clearing deposits at a third bank, on which each could write checks to the other. The
role of the third bank was undertaken by the central bank. Accordingly, banks usually hold
some deposit balances at the central bank for settlement of clearing balances38). The clearing
balance for the individual banks is normally settled through transfers of balances between
accounts held at the central bank39). These deposit balances of banks held at the central bank
are called reserves40).
For each debt there is a corresponding claim, so that the balance of accounts with the
clearinghouse is always nil. Then, through the account of the clearinghouse, clearing balances
are settled in deposits at the central bank. In our case, for example, bank Z is therefore
debited ¥500,000 and banks W, X and Y are credited with ¥100,000, ¥200,000 and ¥200,000
respectively. The overall mass of payment, i.e. ¥3,200,000, has ultimately been carried out by
only ¥500,000 in deposits at the central bank, without the use of cash. Therefore, the
clearinghouse could minimize the reserves needed for check clearing for the entire banking
system41). Reserve savings through the multilateral clearing method were the motivation for
the organization of the clearinghouse.
As the scope of trade expanded, trade between firms geographically spread out. Checks
might travel, for payments, to distant locations where the bank has no branch offices. If a
check is drawn on a bank outside the area of the local clearinghouse, the procedures become
more involved. Your client deposits a check with you for collection. However, you can not
38) Therefore, we often refer to the central bank as the bankers’ bank.
39) In Japan, for areas where the Bank of Japan does not have branches, settlements are carried out
through inter-bank deposits at specified banks.
40) In Japan, the reserve requirements system was introduced in 1957. Needless to say, banks
voluntarily had held reserve deposits at the Bank of Japan to accommodate clearing balances,
even before the system was introduced.
41) If the paying banks are independent (isolated) banks, receiving banks would require immediate
payment in cash from the paying banks. So independent banks must hold large amounts of cash
reserves in order to avoid insolvency.
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take the check to the clearinghouse for clearing, because the bank on which the check was
written is not a member bank of the clearinghouse. For payment, checks have to be presented
physically at the bank on which they were written. The physical transportation of checks is
costly and likewise shipping notes back is costly too.
Then banks in different parts of the country collect checks and transmit payment through
other banks with which they have working agreements. These banks are called correspondent
banks42). Banks maintain deposit balances at correspondent banks to which proceeds from
check collection could be credited and payments debited. Upon receipt of a check on a distant
bank, the receiving bank would send the check to a correspondent closer to the paying bank for
collection. This bank might, in turn, bring the check to the local clearinghouse for clearing.
This process could reduce the cost of collection and reserves against deposits. However,
bilateral check clearing through a correspondent bank is still costly and inefficient, same as the
check clearing on a bilateral basis in the local clearinghouse. To improve the efficiency of
interbank check clearing between distant market areas, banks joined together to establish the
intercity clearing system43). While the regionally based clearing system is a system of
settlement for checks for the banks of a specified area, the domestic interbank exchange system
is a nation-wide system that settles the net positions among banks participating in the domestic
exchange operations.
Previously, banks settled each other’s differences between debits and credits through
deposits accounts established with each other. The central bank has become the settlement
institution of this system. Checks from remote locations are mailed to the paying bank, and
then the domestic exchange system is used to make interbank settlement44). The settlement
amount of checks passing between the various banks is computed once a day at the system’s
center and each bank’s balance is transmitted to the central bank. As a result, banks are able
to concentrate the settlement of their exchange balances at the central bank. It is efficient for
banks to concentrate settlement of their exchange balances at the central bank.
42) Correspondent banks are also referred to as “vostro banks.” See Blommestein & Summers
(1994).
43) In Japan, the concentrated domestic interbank exchange settlement system was introduced in
1943.
44) Nowadays the domestic exchange settlement system in Japan is the Zengin System that is
operated by the Tokyo Bankers Association. The system handles remittance as well as collection
of checks and bills from distant places between banks participating in the system. Most of the
transactions under the domestic exchange system are processed electronically by the Zengin
System.
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Accordingly, banks hold reserve deposits at the central bank for interbank settlement
resulting from check clearing and domestic exchange operations, which are originally arising
from customer payments. Clearinghouses and the domestic exchange system make possible
the safe, reliable, and speedy transfer of funds to any branch of a member bank. Thus
customer service has improved and funds settlement capacity has increased.
However, every bank cannot completely avoid cash withdrawal. When payday comes,
firms pay their workers wages in cash. Business firms withdraw cash from their bank
accounts. This causes a cash drain, not only for each bank, but also for the banking system as
a whole. In addition to reserve deposits at the central bank, banks must hold as reserves, vault
cash to meet such deposit withdrawal. Banks need to hold not only reserve deposits for
interbank settlement but also vault cash for withdrawals. In practice, bank reserves consist of
reserve deposits at the central bank and vault cash. Banks acquire cash from merchants who
sell households consumer goods for cash. Cash comes from households through merchants to
banks.
Banks whose customer base embraces merchants receive cash much more than banks
whose customer base embraces manufacturers. Banks of merchants find themselves with
surplus funds in their deposits. At the same time, banks of manufacturers find themselves
with deficit funds in their deposits, although they have much more bills to deliver to the other
banks than bills to receive in exchange at the meeting of the clearinghouse.
In the context of the model, for example, manufacturer B might agree to sell his
merchandise to merchant C in exchange for the promissory note that C wrote on her bank Z.
Then B brings C’s note to his bank Y and asks him to buy it. Y agrees to buy it and issues a
demand deposit for B in exchange. Everyday Z receives cash collected from the sale of
consumer goods from C until C’s note becomes due. Z finds himself with excess reserves
until C’s note reaches its payment date. On the contrary, Y finds himself with reserve
deficiencies until C’s note becomes due. When the time comes, Y will be able to deliver C’s
note to Z for collection at the clearinghouse.
A market developed in which banks with excess reserves would lend them to those with
reserve deficiencies. This market came to be known as the inter-bank market45). The bank
with excess reserves, however, will soon receive the bills drawn on it at the meeting of the
clearinghouse. The bank accordingly has to prepare for a future negative clearing balance.
45) In Japan, this market is called the call market, which is the equivalent of the federal funds market
in the US.
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It means that the bank’s reserve surplus is temporary. On the contrary, banks of manufactur-
ers temporarily face a cash shortage, because they will have positive clearing balances when
the bills that they discounted fall due.
Banks of merchants, for instance, utilize their temporary reserve surplus to make call
loans (loans repayable on demand) to banks with temporary reserve deficiencies. When the
bills fall due, banks of merchants could settle their negative clearing balances with their call
loans. Call loans are so liquid that they are an excellent secondary reserve for the banks with
temporary excess reserves. In conjunction with clearinghouses, the interbank market makes
possible a more efficient distribution of reserves throughout the banking system, thereby
contributing toward reducing the efficient quantity of reserves which the banking system as a
whole has to hold46).
To reduce the need to hold large balances in reserves for settlement purposes – deposits at
the central bank and vault cash – banks joined together to build a banking structure which is
composed of branch networks, clearinghouses, the domestic exchange system and the inter-
bank money market. The central bank plays an axial role in the structure of banking as the
final institution of settlement. The central bank forms a critical link in the process of clearing
and settlement, because settlement of claims among banks can finally be effected by transfers
between accounts held at the central bank. The payment system makes possible the safe, reli-
able and speedy transfer of funds to any branch of member banks and the efficient use of
reserves among banks. Accordingly, funds settlement capacity has increased, and the effi-
ciency of the economy in reserves has improved as well. The payment system spreads
reserves throughout the banking system, reducing each bank’s necessary level of reserves and
allowing the system as a whole to provide the maximum amount of lending for a given level of
reserves.
5. Conclusion
This paper has studied an economy in which banks have incentives to issue circulating
46) The principal feature of the call market in the high growth period in Japan was that city banks
were typically borrowers while regional banks, credit co-operatives, and mutual savings banks
were typically lenders. This one-way relationship of funds flows was referred to as “mal-
distribution of funds” (Suzuki, 1987, p. 24). However, this phenomenon, as long as it is the
counterpart of multilateral net clearing positions, does not mean a structural defect in the Japanese
banking system. For further discussion of this point, see Moriyama (1994), chapter IV.
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liabilities as part of the money supply. It solved the question of why the activity of lending
has typically been coupled with the activity of issuing a payments medium. Most modern
theories of intermediaries focus on the role of banks in making loans or taking deposits. In
these theories, bank liabilities play no particular role in making payments. Many economists
have argued that it is important to separate the activity of lending from the activity of issuing
liabilities used in making payments47).
This paper has analyzed the evolution and structure of the institutions comprising the
payment system: branch networks, clearinghouses, the domestic exchange system, the
interbank money market and the central bank. It explained efficiency gains from substituting
credit for cash trading as the underlying economic forces driving the evolution of the payment
system. It began by constructing a model in which cash must be paid out to cover expenses
before any cash is collected from the sale of merchandise. In this environment a liability will
be issued by the firms which desire to invest early and sell or produce later. The firms
employ trade credit in order to save on additional working capital. As an instrument of trade
credit, bills of exchange have played a vital role in financing working capital. Bills of
exchange, however, have some drawbacks as circulating liabilities.
The transaction problems with bills of exchange created opportunities for bodies which
were not yet banks to make a profit by issuing notes in more convenient forms. This led to
the birth of the issuing bank. Issuing banks need to hold some amount of cash reserves
against notes. Banks have a strong incentive to minimize holdings of cash reserves because
such reserves yield no interest. Bankers’ incentive to minimize cash reserves led to the
invention of checks and the emergence of deposit banking, thereby constituting a two-tiered
banking structure: the central bank of issue and private commercial banks.
To improve the efficiency of interbank check clearing or to reduce the need to hold large
reserves, commercial banks joined together to build a banking structure which is composed of
branch networks, clearinghouses, the domestic exchange system and the interbank money
market. The central bank plays a pivotal role in the structure of banking as the final
institution of settlement.
The capital savings associated with trade credit have been the fundamental motivation for
47) For example, in the US, Milton Friedman (1960, pp. 65–76) urged that all banks should hold
reserves equal to 100 percent of their deposits, prohibiting them from making loans through
issuing deposits. In the 1980s, facing increasing financial crises, the same notion was advocated
as “narrow banking,” see Litan (1987). In the 1990s, a similar financial crisis in Japan also
stimulated the narrow bank proposal. See, for example, Royama (1997).
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banking business. At the banking level, the reserve savings through establishing a banking
structure have been the motivation for the evolution of the financial system. There are three
levels of economic gains serving as driving forces that caused the evolution of the payment
system. At the base stands capital savings of firms through trade credit; in the middle stands
reserve savings of banks with the development of modern banking; and at the top stand costs
savings of money from the substitution of inconvertible banknotes for commodity money.
This paper scarcely deals with the role of the state in the evolution of central banking.
Regardless of legal reserve requirements, banks always need to hold a fraction of their deposits
in the form of reserves. This is known as the reserve ratio. This ratio is set by the bank’s
need to provide liquidity for its customers. Then what economic factors underlie the bank’s
needs? These are topics for future research.
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